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Abstract:
This paper provides an empirical analysis of income stratification in contemporary Russian 
society and its dynamics in recent decades. The paper presents a detailed analysis of different 
approaches (absolute and relative) to defining income groups. It indicates that the most widely 
used thresholds of the absolute approach cannot be efficiently applied to contemporary Russian 
society, as they fail to define the subgroups within the population, while the relative approach, 
based on the median income as the social standard of living, appears more effective for income 
stratification in Russia. A specific income stratification scale is suggested. Its application 
shows that middle-income groups currently dominate the income structure; however, the 
incomes of their representatives are not high in absolute terms and their living standards are 
quite modest. Income stratification in Russia has noticeably transformed over the last 20 years 
– the middle-income group has been growing while the low income and high-income groups 
have been declining. The proposed scale implies potential for structural adjustments such as 
regional- and settlement-specific disparities in income distribution; it can be easily replicated 
and opens up the potential for future research across broad areas, including international 
comparisons of income stratification in societies undergoing transitional processes.
  
Keywords: Russia; income; income groups; stratification; poverty; wealth; middle class.
Introduction
Income stratification seems to be one of the most straightforward approaches to analysing the 
structure of a society, as it applies a one-dimensional gradualist scheme of stratification: a ‘low 
income – high income’ scale, and makes it possible to define hierarchically arranged groups 
(economic classes) on the basis of income. Income stratification commonly operates with three 
broad categories: poor, middle class and wealthy (high-income, affluent) and different subgroups 
within or between these (Eisenhauer, 2011). Income stratification scales are used to obtain and 
compare quantitative estimates of well-off and poor groups, to gauge the risk of vulnerability to 
poverty and low income (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014), and to assess the degree of inequality 
(World Bank, 2016). This type of stratification is widely used for international cross-country 
comparisons (Meyer & Sanchez-Paramo, 2014), as it is based on income level, which is a relatively 
universal indicator. It is also important for social policies and being used to set thresholds that 
define the poor and needy among the population who may be eligible for welfare; therefore, 
different approaches to income stratification might mean different groups of poor are supported 
by social policy (Anikin & Slobodenyuk, 2018).
However, choosing a scale for income stratification is not a trivial methodological exercise. 
The methods used to define groups based on their positions in the income distribution can be 
summed up in two broad approaches – absolute and relative, which are conceptually similar to the 
definition of absolute and relative poverty (Foster, 1998) or absolute and relative inequality (Niño‐
Zarazúa, Roope, & Tarp, 2017). Most of these approaches (and the resulting income thresholds) 
have been developed for different purposes and countries at different stages of social and economic 
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development1, so they are only to a certain extent applicable to Russia (Lokshin & Yemtsov, 2013). 
Moreover, as will be demonstrated later, the methods in use mostly focus on defining certain 
groups among the population rather than devising an income stratification scale for society as a 
whole. Therefore, the paper aims to contribute to existing literature by defining a suitable method 
for capturing income stratification in contemporary Russia at its current level of development and 
characterising its general configuration and dynamics in recent years. 
Russia makes an interesting case study for income stratification for several reasons. As in many 
societies in transition, the 1990s saw a drastic change in the socio-economic situation in the 
country. Economic liberalization reforms, including price liberalization in 1992, led to soaring 
prices and a respective drop in real income for the population as a whole, as well as a drastic 
aggravation of social differentiation. Unemployment and high inflation, as well as the non-
payment of salaries and pensions, along with social benefits that were insufficient to cover even the 
minimum subsistence level caused a significant deterioration in people’s incomes and contributed 
to mass poverty within the population during this period. However, as the country’s economy and 
population adapted to the new reality, the situation began to change. Starting from 2001, the share 
of the population classed as poor fell every year (this trend continued steadily till the start of the 
new economic crisis in 2014) as a result of increased minimum rates of pay and social benefits, 
including the rapid growth of pensions, the elimination of salary non-payment and the reduction 
of employment in low-paid sectors of the economy. The growth of the population’s income over 
the past decade led to a qualitative change in the proportion of affluent and disadvantaged groups. 
However, the configuration of the income structure in general and its dynamics have not yet 
been the focus of analysis. Most Russian literature is devoted to the analysis of separate groups 
(mostly, the poor) or incomes of the population in general and their inequality (“Dinamika…”, 
2014; Abanokova & Lokshin, 2014; Bobkov, 2012; Lukyanova, 2013; Mozhina, 2001; Shevyakov, 2010), 
while not attempting to describe the general income stratification model for society as a whole 
or analyse changes in its configuration caused by shifts in the relative shares of different income 
groups over the years. It is this approach that determines the scientific contribution of the paper. 
Achieving the stated goal requires several steps: reviewing the key approaches to absolute and 
relative income stratification, applying them to empirical data from the last few years, choosing 
a specific scale of income stratification for Russia that works most efficiently in describing the 
modern reality, and evaluating the specifics and dynamics of income stratification by applying it 
to empirical data. 
The first section of this paper describes different approaches to income stratification, while in the 
second section we apply some of these methods to the representative Russia-wide survey data. 
We offer an income stratification scale based on the median income and define the proportions 
of different social groups in Russia identified on the basis of their income, provide the basic 
characteristics of their standards of living and show the dynamics of income stratification in 
Russia for 1994–2015. In conclusion we sum up our findings and propose questions for future 
research.
Income-based social stratification: general approaches and scales
The main methodological issue for income stratification is to select from available approaches that 
apply different concepts and criteria when defining income groups: absolute income thresholds 
(distinguishing income groups in relation to a clearly defined amount of income), or relative 
income thresholds (based on the mean (less often) or median (more often) income, or income 
distribution by percentile groups) and the boundaries for different groups within the scale. We will 
start by reviewing these approaches and the reasoning behind them, as well as providing examples 
of the boundaries used in different versions of the absolute and relative approaches. 
1     In the paper, we use terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries to describe societies with different economic and socio-
cultural levels of development. In line with other studies, we prefer to apply this terminology rather than to use the World 
Bank’s approach, that of distinguishing high- and low-income countries, because the concept of socio-economic development 
provides a broader set of analytical tools for understanding the fundamental differences between countries. See, for example: 
Chun, N., Hasan, R., Rahman, M. H., and Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2016) and Mitra, S., Posarac, A., and Vick, B. (2013).
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One of the complications of income-based stratification lies in the fact that many studies in this 
area focus not on the society as a whole, but on definitions of separate groups (poor, middle class, 
wealthy) and the subgroups among them. In some cases, the threshold of poverty is used as the 
lower boundary when defining the middle class; however, in other cases middle class (middle 
strata) is defined separately, without discussing whether those who are below the set level can be 
considered poor or whether there is an interim group of vulnerable to poverty, but not yet poor. 
Defining the upper boundary of the middle class or thresholds for high-income strata is even more 
problematic and there is no consensus on where high income begins. That leads us to the need to 
review literature devoted to separate income groups within the absolute and relative approaches. 
Absolute scales of income stratification 
The absolute approach to income stratification is largely borrowed from the corresponding 
understanding of poverty starting from Rowntree (1901; 1913) – via setting a quantitative needs-
based poverty line, which is typically defined as a monetary cut-off point set at subsistence 
level which is in turn set at the value of goods and services (the consumer basket) necessary for 
satisfying essential needs and meeting mandatory payments. Administrative regulations may set 
the relative share of non-food commodities in the consumer basket (as is done in Russia and the 
USA). 
Following this logic, the Russian Federal Service for State Statistics (FSSS) defines groups of the 
poor for statistical and analytical purposes (“The Federal State Statistics…”, 2015) based on the 
comparison of the incomes of households to the subsistence minimum. Statistical services in 
many other countries, including the joint Statistics Service of the CIS (and not only the low- and 
middle-income ones), also use the subsistence level to define the poverty threshold (Yasinskiy, 
2014). The definition of poverty in the US follows the same principles.
National poverty lines, defined in specific geographical, economic, cultural and other contexts, 
make international comparisons only partly relevant. It is also necessary to take into account 
the nation's stage of economic development when defining the boundaries of its income groups 
(Cowell, 2011). 
In comparative research, the methodology of the World Bank (WB) on poverty measures and 
their variations are widely used (Chen & Ravallion, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Ravallion, 2008; Ravallion, 
Chen, & Sangraula, 2009; Ravallion, Datt & van de Walle, 1991). This method draws income group 
thresholds according to the poverty lines of the countries in the WB sample (126 countries in total). 
This approach was constructed and used mainly for the analysis of the situation in developing 
countries (22 in the 1980s), and their poverty lines served as the basis for the poverty threshold in 
the method in general. 
In the past, the WB widely used a global poverty measure set at $1 per day. The original ‘$1-a-day’ 
method was an average of absolute lines (Ravallion et al., 1991), converted to international dollars 
at purchasing power parity (PPP), for such regions as Africa, East Asia, and the Pacific and South 
Asia. For middle-income countries (in such regions as Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa), the original poverty headcount ratio was 
set at $2 per day (the median poverty threshold for all developing nations). However, these values 
were reassessed several times because of the increased number of countries in the sample for 
international comparison, inflation in the US, a new methodology of collecting PPPs and other 
factors (Deaton & Aten, 2014). Numerous WB reports used various thresholds such as $1, $1.25, 
$1.45, $2, $2.5 per day. Now, instead of the previously used thresholds values of $1 and $2, the WB 
uses $1.9 and $3.1 per day, respectively (2011 PPP). The amount equal to double the cut-off value 
of absolute poverty is seen as the threshold of vulnerability to poverty; that is, indicating a high 
risk of poverty.
26 Svetlana V. Mareeva & Yulia P. Lezhnina
The WB concept of drawing the poverty line is further applied to defining the middle class in the 
developing countries2, though different thresholds are used for this purpose. Ravallion (2010) sets 
the lower boundary of the middle class in developing countries at the poverty line ($2 per day) 
and the upper boundary ($13 per day) at the poverty line in the US, therefore suggesting that 
members of the middle class in these countries are not poor compared to the living standards of 
the majority of their residents but are poor by the standards of developed or wealthy countries. 
He also notes that it can be useful to single out the upper middle class in developing countries 
at the lower boundary of at least $9 per day (equal to the poverty line in Uruguay, which has the 
highest cut-off value of poverty among developing nations studied in Ravallion (2010)). The author 
believes that in order to be classified as ‘Western middle class’ one should at least have an income 
above the US poverty line. 
Often the following version of the income stratification in Russia and other countries in Europe 
and Central Asia is proposed in WB publications: poor ($5 or less); vulnerable ($5–10); middle 
class ($10 and more per day) (Meyer & Sanchez-Paramo, 2014). The middle class can be further 
subdivided also based on income: $10–25 per day, $25–50 per day, $50 and more per day (Grant 
& Hansl, 2015). Applying the same approach to other regions, the respective income in dollars is 
different (see Vakis, Jamele & Lucchetti, 2015; Dang & Ianchovichina, 2016). 
Different authors provide other variations of the absolute approach to defining middle class in the 
income structure of the population. Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), focusing on defining the global 
middle class, choose the upper boundary of its per capita income at $50 per day, which is equal 
to the average income in Italy, the least wealthy among G7 members. The lower threshold is set 
at equal to the mean earnings in Brazil ($12 per day). Kharas (2010) chooses the lower threshold 
of middle-class income in developing countries ($10 per day) as equal to the average between the 
poverty lines of the two developed countries with the lowest of such values – Italy and Portugal 
(however, the ground for the upper boundary is different – the author proposes $100, which is 
double the median income in Luxembourg, the richest of the developed countries). 
Some papers verify the lower and upper bounds of middle class incomes by comparing their 
estimates to those produced by other approaches; for example, by relative approaches. For 
instance, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) define the middle class of developing countries as the group 
between the poor in these countries and the middle class in developed countries (e.g. the USA), 
setting the range of per capita income at $2–10 per day (splitting them further into three groups: 
$2–4, 4–6 and $6–10), and compare their results to those of Easterly (2001) and Birdsall, Graham, 
and Pettinato (2000), who define middle class using a relative approach framework, via quintiles.
Other papers justify the lower and upper bounds of income using theoretical arguments. López-
Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014), for example, define the lower boundary of middle-class income as 
the maximum level of bearable economic instability for the middle class; in other words, exhibiting 
a 10% probability of slipping into a poverty at a five-year horizon (which is the average level of 
poverty in countries like Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica, but slightly lower than for the whole 
region). 
Non-academic research centres also work towards income stratification scales using national 
poverty lines and findings from both WB studies and academic papers (see Table 1 regarding PEW 
Research Centre (2015) and Court and Narasimhan (2010)). For instance, Rose (2016) proposes an 
income stratification for the US, setting a 2014 income threshold for the poor at 1.5x3 the federal 
poverty line (i.e. up to $30,000 equalised annual income for a household of three members), while 
the rich are defined in line with survey responses from people regarding the relative number of rich 
in the country; that is, 1–2%, corresponding to annual incomes of $350,000. The population with 
incomes between these thresholds are categorised as middle class with the following subgroups: 
2     In economic literature, the term ‘class’ is widely used in the sense of grouping of people on the basis of income (See, for 
example: Eisenhauer (2011). Among sociologists, this approach is known as a ‘simple gradational analysis’, which is opposed 
to the measures of a class via ‘differential control over income and labour’ (Wright, 2004).
3     Here and below we use “х” meaning “times” (1,5 times federal poverty line).
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upper-middle (from $100,000 (5x the official poverty line) to $350,000 per year), middle-middle 
($50,000 – $100,000), and lower-middle ($30,000 – $50,000).
Approaches based on WB methodology in general can be considered ‘weakly relative’ (Ravallion 
& Chen, 2010b), since the living standards of high-income countries serve as benchmarks for 
affluent social groups in developing countries, and the income thresholds are based on calibrated 
national poverty lines. The disparity between the living standards of developing nations and the 
mass social strata of developed countries leaves little opportunity to propose a unified scale of 
income-based stratification for the developing nations. In the case of more prosperous nations, 
researchers either multiply these figures by some factor or use entirely different approaches. Since 
developed nations are more concerned about the issues of social exclusion and socio-economic 
deprivation (Townsend, 1987), rather than physical survival (as in African countries, for example), 
most developed countries apply relative poverty lines (or a ‘strongly relative approach’), whereas 
the absolute approach is most often used in developing countries.
Table 1 presents a review of the existing ways of categorising income groups using the methods 
based on the absolute approach. 
Generally speaking, though there is no consensus in the literature on income stratification 
thresholds, the views on the upper threshold of the low-income and the lower threshold of the 
middle class strata are more congruent than estimates of the upper boundary of middle class 
or thresholds for high-income strata (in other words, there is more consensus about who can 
be considered poor than who can be defined as wealthy). For example, Rank (1999), Danziger, 
Gottschalk, and Smolensky (1989) and Hirschl, Altobelli, and Rank (2001) set the upper demarcation 
of the middle class at 8, 10 and 12x national poverty lines, respectively. Furthermore, theoretical 
justifications of these thresholds provoke many questions since they are often postulated in an ad 
hoc manner, or superficially considered.
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Table 1: Absolute income thresholds for income stratification according to selected papers, in US 
dollars (PPP) per capita per day *
Notes:
* As various authors focus on different social strata and/or present different configurations of 
social structures, some cells in the table hereafter (see Tab. 2) left blank, meaning these positions 
were not mentioned by the respective authors in their publications. The authors of this paper 
Authors, 
years 
Low income Middle income (MI)
High 
income
Geography of 
methodology 
implementation
Extremely 
poor Poor
Vulnerable 
to poverty
Lower 
MI
Middle 
MI
Higher 
MI
Ravallion 
(2010);  
Ravallion et 
al. (2009)
1.25 2- 9 9-13 Developing countries
Vakis et al. 
(2015) below 2.5 2.5-4 4-10 10-50
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
Dang and 
Ianchovichina 
(2016)
below 
2 2-4.9
above 
4.9
The Middle East 
and North Africa
Meyer and 
Sanchez-
Paramo (2014)
below 
5** 5-10 10-50
above 
50
Russia 
Federation,  
Europe and 
Central Asia
Grant and 
Hansl (2015)
below 
5 5-10 10-25 25-50
above 
50 Russia
Milanovic 
and Yitzhaki 
(2002)
12-50 Global middle class,1993
Banerjee and 
Duflo (2008) 2-4 4-6 6-10
11 developing 
countries***
Kharas (2010);  
Cárdenas, 
Kharas, and 
Henao (2011)
10-100
Global middle 
class;
Latin America
López-Calva 
and Ortiz-
Juarez (2014)
10-50 Chile, Mexico, Peru
PEW Research 
Center (2015)
below 
2 2.01-10
10.01-
20
20.01-
50 Over 50 All countries
Court and 
Narasimhan 
(2010) ****
9 9-15 15-40 40 -77 Over 77
Developing 
countries, 
including 
Russia, Poland
Based on poverty line, multiplication coefficient
Burkhauser, 
Smeeding, 
and Merz 
(1996)
 
2-5 
and
0.75-5
USA & Germany
Rose (2016) 1.5 1.5-2.5 2.5-5 5-17.5 1-2% USA
Hirschl et al. 
(2001)
8, 10 
and 12 USA
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aligned the income groups outlined by the researchers with the categories in the table to their 
own subjective discretion, as all the authors use their own classifications. 
** It should be noted that some publications set the poverty threshold for Russia at $4 per day 
(Statistika SNG, 2015). The “extreme poverty” and “poverty” levels for all the countries in the 
“Europe and Central Asia” region (where the WB places Russia) are set at $2.5 and $5 per day, 
respectively.
*** This classification was based on expenditures.
**** A referential adjustment to comparable indicators is provided.
Relative scales of income stratification 
The relative approach to defining the boundaries between groups in income stratification is a 
major alternative to the absolute approach. It divides groups by income based either on percentile 
distribution or comparison with the average or median income that indicates an average standard of 
living in a specific society. 
The definition of groups based on percentiles often focuses on the middle class and is carried out 
in a symmetrical manner. For example, Easterly (2001) and Barro (2000) rank everyone within the 
second to fourth percentiles (between 20 and 80%) as middle class. Dallinger (2013) applies the same 
boundaries but also proposes using quintiles ‘in order to capture the internal differentiation of the 
societal middle’ (Dallinger, 2013, p. 88). That is, the middle-middle class in a narrow sense is the 
middle 20% of the income distribution (quintile 3); lower-middle class is below this (quintile 2), and, 
upper-middle class is above (quintile 4). Partridge (1997) defines the middle class as Dallinger's middle-
middle class (quintile 3) only.
Quintiles other than the central ones are also used to define the middle class in academic literature, 
but less often. Alesina and Perotti (1996) as well as Bellettini and Ceroni (2007), for example, define the 
middle class as those in the third and fourth quintiles, whereas Solimano (2008) sets out the middle 
class as those within the third and ninth deciles. 
The income boundaries of the most affluent groups are the most disputed issue in income stratification, 
even when divided by deciles. Peichl and Pestel (2011), as well as Bellettini and Ceroni (2007), set 
the respective upper boundary at the 80th percentile, which is in line with most other studies that 
consider the top boundary of middle-class income as the lower threshold of high-income groups (see 
Table 2). There are also approaches that rank a much lower share of the population (0.5–10%) as in 
the high-income strata: Solimano (2008) sets it at 10%, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) at 1% or 
5%, Carroll (2002), Weicher (1997) and Wolff (2010) at 1%, Beeghley (2004) at 0.9%, and Feenberg and 
Poterba (2000) at just 0.5%; the well-cited work of Piketty uses several of these cut-offs (Piketty, 2014). 
However, the authors scarcely provide any clear reasons for their choice of income thresholds. 
The percentile method is often criticized (e.g. by Birdsall, Graham, & Pettinato (2000)) because it yields 
groups of predetermined fixed sizes. This problem does not arise if the income stratification is based 
on median income; another advantage is that it eliminates the distorting effect of outliers.
 
OECD methodology, widely used by European statistics agencies, defines the poverty line at half the 
median household income of the total population (though 40%, 60% or 70% levels can also be used). 
Eurostat views the equivalized income of less than 60% of the median income in the country as the at-
risk-of-poverty threshold (Eurostat, 2017). These figures are widely used by the academic community 
to define relative poverty indicators. 
The relative approach based on median income traditionally defines the middle class as those with 
incomes ‘around’ the median income – from 0.75x to 1.25x (Thurow (1987), Birdsall et al. (2000), 
Pressman (2007), Pressman & Scott (2009), and Chauvel (2013)). Atkinson and Brandolini (2013) propose 
a theoretical reasoning for the 0.75x and 1.25x cut-offs. Following Horrigan and Haugen (1988), the 
authors suppose that the lower endpoint of the middle class should represent ‘an income significantly 
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above the poverty level’ and ‘comfortably clear’ ‘of being at-risk-of-poverty’. In the course of this, the 
at-risk-of-poverty line is set as 0.6x median of disposable money income (the sum of all cash incomes 
earned by the household, net of income taxes and social contributions), whereas the lower boundary 
of the middle class is defined as the at-risk-of-poverty line increased by 25% or 0.75x the median cut-
off. In contrast, the rationale behind setting 1.25x of the median income as an upper endpoint of the 
middle class is less obvious, apart from its symmetry with the 0.75x threshold; the authors also stress 
that this threshold should not be treated as the “affluence line”, since in that case a third or more 
of the population would form an “upper class” (Pressman, 2007), which is unrealistic. Therefore, 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2013) distinguish the middle class (0.75x – 1.25x) and the ‘intermediary’ lower 
and upper middle classes, located between the poor and the middle class and the middle class and the 
rich respectively (their boundaries are 0.6 – 0.75x and 1.25 – 1.67x of the median income). 
Chauvel (2006) defines the lower and upper demarcations of the middle-class income within a wider 
range – from 0.50x to 2x relative to adjusted disposable income (total net income after taxes and 
transfers, adjusted by household size, where the equivalence scale is the square-root of the number 
of residents in the household). Later, Chauvel (2013), taking into account the work of his colleagues, 
particularly Pressman (2007) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2013), and analysing the equalised relative 
disposable income distribution curve, concludes that the middle class is not homogeneous and divides 
it into "lower" (0.75 – 1.25x median) and “upper” (1.5 – 2.5x median) segments. Grabka and Frick (2008) 
use the 0.7 – 1.5x median range for Germany, while Blackburn and Bloom (1985) apply values of 0.6 
– 2.25x for the US, Vanneman and Dubey (2013) use 0.5 – 2х for India, and Ólafsson and Kristjánsson 
(2013) apply 0.75 – 1.5x for Iceland. 
The US-based PEW Research Center (Fry & Kochhar, 2016) defines the middle class (or the population 
“with the average income level”) as those with an annual income per household of three members 
(the closest integer number to the average household size in the US in 2015 – 2.5x) from 0.67 to 2x 
the nationwide median. OECD methodology uses the measure of middle-incomes as household net 
income between 0.75х and 2х the median (OECD, 2016).
The upper threshold of middle-class incomes, serving as the lower threshold for the rich, also has no 
agreed definition. Peichl, Schaefer and Scheicher (2010) see it as 2x the median, Brzezinski (2010) as 2, 
3 and 4x the median (and the upper 1%, 5% and 10%). According to Medeiros (2006), the affluence line 
(a term he uses based on “poverty line” to define the rich) may be considered to be at the level of 4x 
standard deviations above the average income, which constitutes just 1% of the population in Brazil.
Attempts to justify the income demarcations of groups using the relative approach to stratification 
are more typical for studies focused on higher income strata. Atkinson and Brandolini (2013) believe 
that high-income groups should be able to hire personnel for some chores, such as babysitting and 
cleaning, and their net income after these kinds of services have been accounted for should not 
lead the family into poverty (i.e. should not fall below the 60% cut-off). Checking various ratios of 
spending for personal needs and the services of hired workers, these authors set the upper boundary 
of middle-class income at 2x and 3x the median income but do not comment on the relevance of their 
conclusions. Eisenhauer (2011, p. 297) defines the rich as those who “could, in theory, liquidate their 
assets, purchase risk-free bonds, and thereby generate sufficient after-tax interest income to remain 
above the poverty level indefinitely without incurring risk and without having to earn additional 
income through employment”. Medeiros (2006) defines the affluence line as the level of income 
that enables the elimination of poverty (defined through a set monetary line) in society through 
redistribution. This approach is based on the national poverty line, not on the median income. 
According to Brazilian data for 1999, the poverty line was at the level of the income of the 33rd 
percentile of the population, while the affluence line exceeded this level by 26.8x (i.e. $1,142 per month 
per household in 1999 prices). 
There are also attempts to develop methods for defining the high-income group by adding wealth 
indicators. Hauser and Becker (2002), discussing the case of Germany in 1998, set the affluence line at 
double the median of equalised net income with additional assets in the value of one million German 
marks per household member. 
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Table 2 presents a review of studies on income stratification and social group thresholds using the 
relative approach. This method is mostly used in income stratification research in developed countries. 
However, the relative approach lacks transparency for international comparisons (Ferreira, Messina, 
Rigolini, López-Calva, Lugo, & Vakis, 2013). The adherents of the relative approach lack consensus in 
the selection of thresholds in income stratification and reasoning (as with the absolute approach).
Table 2: Relative income thresholds for income stratification according to selected papers
Authors, 
years
Extremely 
poor
Low income Middle income High income Geography of 
methodology 
implementationPoor Vulnerable
Lower 
MI
Middle  
MI
Higher 
MI Affluent Rich
Based on quintiles or percentiles, quintiles/ percentiles
Alesina 
and Perotti 
(1996);
Bellettini 
and Ceroni 
(2007)
3-4 
quintiles
71 countries;
22 countries 
(OECD)
Partridge 
(1997)
3 
quintile USA
Barro 
(2000);
Easterly 
(2001)
2-4 
quintiles
84 countries;
175 countries
Solimano 
(2008)
3-9 
quintiles 129 countries
Peichl and 
Pestel (2011)
5 
quintile Germany
Dynan et al. 
(2004)
upper 1% 
and 5% USA
Feenberg 
and Poterba 
(2000)
upper 
0.5% USA
Carroll 
(2002);
Weicher 
(1997);
Wolff (2010)
upper 1% USA
Gornick, 
Jantti et al. 
(2013)
2-4 
quintiles
High- and 
middle-income 
countries (LIS)
Dallinger 
(2013)
2 
quintile
3 
quintile
4 
quintile
19 (post)
industrial 
countries
Based on median, multiplication coefficient
OECD below 0.5
Eurostat below 0.6
Blackburn 
and Bloom 
(1985)
0.60 - 
2.25 USA
Davis and 
Huston 
(1992)
0.5-1.5 USA
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Note:
* Grabka and Frick (2008) define eight income groups, however, with more detailed focus on the 
middle income groups. To fit our classification, we consider them into one category.
Authors, 
years
Extremely 
poor
Low income Middle income High income Geography of 
methodology 
implementationPoor Vulnerable
Lower 
MI
Middle  
MI
Higher 
MI Affluent Rich
Thurow 
(1984);
Birdsall et 
al. (2000);
Pressman 
(2007);
Pressman 
and Scott 
(2009)
0.75 - 
1.25
USA;
30 countries, 
including 
high-income 
transition 
economies and 
Latin America;
11 developed 
countries (LIS)
Chauvel 
(2013)
0.75-
1.25 1.5-2.5
France, Italy, 
Norway,  
USA
Grabka and 
Frick (2008) below 0.5 0.5-0.7 0.7-0.9
0.9-1.1
1.1-1.3* 1.3-1.5 1.5-2 above 2 Germany
Peichl et al. 
(2010) below 0.6 over 2 Germany
Eisenhauer 
(2011) below 0.6
Calculated 
a richness 
line 
Italy
Smeeding 
(2006) below 0.5
11 developed 
countries (LIS) 
including the 
USA
Kangas 
(2001) below 0.5 over 3
Brzezinski 
(2010)
2, 3 
and 4 Poland
Atkinson 
and 
Brandolini 
(2013)
0.6-0.75 0.75-1.25 1.25-1.67
over 2 
or 3
11 European 
countries, USA, 
Canada, Taiwan, 
Mexico
Ólafsson 
and 
Kristjánsson 
(2013)
0.75-1.5 Iceland
Vanneman 
and Dubey 
(2013)
below 0.5 0.5-2 over 2 India
PEW 
Research 
Center
below 
2/3 2/3-2 over 2 USA
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To sum up, it can be claimed that the primary basis for selecting an approach to income 
stratification is the country’s level of development. While research in well-developed and high-
income countries requires the application of relative income thresholds that correspond to their 
average standard of living, it is more common in countries with low income and weak progress 
in modernisation to measure poverty on the basis of needs and adopt an absolute approach to 
stratification. In the case of Russia, the question of classifying it as a developed or a developing 
country is important because of its transitional state. It inevitably perplexes scholars searching for 
an income stratification model. The next section will address the empirical evidence surrounding 
this issue in contemporary Russian society.
 
Income stratification of the Russian society: what does empirical analysis demonstrate
Empirical Data
As shown above, different approaches to income stratification have been designed for various 
research purposes and for countries at different stages of social and economic development – so 
their efficiency may vary when applied to Russia. We now focus on choosing the most relevant 
approach to income stratification in Russia by applying some of the most widely used methods 
based on the absolute approach (WB method, the ‘Western middle class’ method) and relative 
approach to data provided by a nationwide representative survey – the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey of the Higher School of Economics (RLMS–HSE4). The RLMS-HSE is a series 
of nationally representative household-based surveys designed to monitor the effects of Russian 
reforms on the health and economic welfare of households and individuals in the Russian 
Federation. It is conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics and 
ZAO Demoscope together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. The RLMS-HSE implies a multi-stage stratified probability sample. We use a cross-sectional 
sample from 1994 to 2015; the sample size amounts to 5,000–7,000 households in each year.
 
 According to the capacities of RLMS–HSE data, we consider households as recipients of income; to 
calculate the proportion of various income groups, we consider the number of individuals residing 
in households with different income levels. For the relative approach, we also apply an equivalence 
scale that is described in the corresponding section below. 
Absolute approaches to income stratification in Russia: empirical evidence
The absolute approach to income stratification is more familiar to Russian researchers since it 
is officially used in Russia for defining poverty; for this purpose, a subsistence level is used, and 
households and individuals can be grouped into poor / not poor according to how their income 
relates to the subsistence level. Income stratification based on the official subsistence level can 
be expanded by the further differentiation of the ‘not poor’ group into subgroups according to 
the ratio of their income and the subsistence level. The model of income stratification relative 
to the subsistence level helps gauge the proportion who are poor, and defines groups that are 
characterised by a higher risk of poverty; that is, population with incomes close to the poverty 
line. Sociological data show that the incomes of the largest group – almost one-third of the entire 
population – fall within 1 – 1.5x of the subsistence level; this is also where the median income 
lies (Slobodenyuk, 2017). This model of income stratification based on the subsistence level is 
important for the analysis of the poverty zone and the risks of it expanding; it also helps identify 
those who most need welfare assistance. However, to analyse the groups higher on the income 
scale, income thresholds in relation to the subsistence level must be further studied and validated.
 
Let us now turn to another well-cited version of the absolute approach that is used by the WB to 
define various income groups across countries. The income stratification model based on the WB 
methodology for Russia in 2014 and 2015 (using PPP calculated by WB at a USD/RUB PPP rate of 
22.57 in 2014 and 23.97 in 20155) is shown in Table 3.
4     Websites of the RLMS-HSE: https://www.hse.ru/en/rlms/ and http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse.
5     Data source: World Bank data bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PRVT.PP?locations=RU).
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Table 3: Income stratification based on the World Bank methodology
Income groups Daily income, $12
2014 2015
Monthly per 
capita income, 
PPP, roubles 
Share of 
income 
groups, %
Monthly per 
capita income, 
PPP, roubles
Share of 
income 
groups, 
%
Poor
2.5 and less 1,693 and less 0.4 1,798 and less 0.3
2.5 - 5 1,693.1 – 3,386 2 1,798.1 – 3,596 1.2
Vulnerable 5 - 10 3,386.1 – 6,771 10.3 3,596.1 – 7,191 9.9
Middle class
10 - 25 6,771.1 – 16,928 54.6 7,191.1 – 17,978 56.3
25 - 50 16,928.1 – 33,855 27.3 17,978.1 – 35,955 27
Over 50 Over 33,855 5.4 Over 35,955 5.3
Source: RLMS-HSE, calculation by authors
The application of the WB methodology shows an extremely low share of the poor in Russia 
(just 1–2% even during the economic crisis) and those at high risk of poverty are about 10%. 
The overwhelming majority of the population falls within the middle class (though the lower-
middle class prevails). Given that the minimum middle-class per capita income ($10 per day) in 
this methodology equals around 7,000 roubles per month in PPP, this result is not surprising. 
This threshold is about 50% of the median income (which was 14,000 roubles per month in 2014 
according to RLMS-HSE datasets, and 20,594 roubles per month according to FSSS; the former 
figure was unchanged in 2015 while the FSSS estimate increased to 22,729 roubles) and cuts off 
only the poorest group (0.5x median income is a widely used threshold of relative poverty). This 
threshold for the middle class is even lower than the official Russian subsistence level. Hence 
the middle class according to this definition is disproportionally large and heterogeneous, and 
even its division into three subgroups does not help analyse its inner structure, as over half of the 
population still falls within one subgroup (lower-middle class). 
However, the followers of the WB approach highlight that these poverty thresholds are developed 
for the purposes of international comparison and have a limited application for the analysis of 
poverty in any given country (Lokshin & Yemtsov, 2013). In the course of international comparison, 
both statistical and survey data show that Russia is better off regarding population incomes than 
the other BRICS countries and developing nations. While in Russia per capita incomes below $5 per 
day are almost non-existent, this level of income is typical for 20% of Brazilians, 30% in Chinese, 
over 50% of South Africans and most of the population in India.6 Income stratification in Russia is 
currently much closer to that of Western Europe (where most of the population are middle class 
and the relative number of the poor is small) rather than China or Latin America. This situation is 
the result of fundamental changes in Russian society, which have occurred over the last 15 years 
and can be traced using this methodology. The calculations by the WB show that only slightly 
more than a quarter of the Russian population (27%) belonged to the middle class in 2000, while 
this share increased to 60% by 2010. Sociological surveys show that the expansion of the middle 
class further continued in 2014–2015. Such drastic changes in personal income make the use of 
such poverty/middle-class income ranges inefficient at the current stage of Russia's economic 
development – they cannot define income subgroups within the largest part of the population and 
only cut off population with lowest and highest incomes. Russian society has already moved away 
6     Calculations based on World Bank PovcalNet data, last available years for each country (2011-2015) are used.
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from the minimum physical survival standard for the population that these ranges are based on 
(“Dinamika…”, 2014), so different methods of income-based stratification are needed. Therefore, 
most methods based on the absolute approach that set the middle-class income threshold at 
$10–13 per day cannot be used for an income stratification model of contemporary Russia. 
In order to give full coverage to the absolute thresholds that are used, following the approach 
by Ravallion et al. (2009), we now turn to the concept of the ‘Western middle class’ that include 
those who are not poor by US standards. The calculations based on US poverty thresholds using 
RLMS-HSE data for 2015 show that 45.9% of the Russian population can be considered poor while 
the remaining 54.1% enter the ‘Western middle class’ (data from 2014 show similar results – 44.6% 
were poor and 55.6% belonged to ‘Western middle class’). In the US, the picture is qualitatively 
different – official poverty rate was 14.8% in 2014 and 13.5% in 2015.7
These results provide entirely different estimates of poverty and the middle class in Russia. 
However, this approach cannot be used as a working model of income stratification as it defines 
only two groups, without taking into account their internal heterogeneity and the existence of 
other groups between them (vulnerable/needy population and so forth). The straightforward use 
of the US poverty criteria introduced in the concept of the ‘Western middle class’ for Russia is also 
debatable, since the gap in GDP between them is similar in scale to the gap between Russia and 
many developing countries, and their direct comparison cannot be relevant.
Therefore, the income group thresholds set for developing countries by the widely cited income 
stratification methodologies based on the absolute approach turn out to be not completely 
suitable for Russia regarding its stage of socio-economic development and the general aim of the 
study to construct an income stratification model for the whole society. Therefore, we now turn 
to the relative approaches. 
Relative approaches to income stratification in Russia: selecting a scale
As demonstrated above, there are different versions of relative approaches and the income strata 
defined on their basis. Some of them predetermine the size of these groups while attributing 
specific income quintiles or deciles to certain income groups. In Russia, the data on the per capita 
income distribution by deciles and quintiles is published by the FSSS. This distribution has been 
slowly changing over the last 20–25 years but the relative share of the two lower quintiles in total 
income has been decreasing; the recent economic crisis reversed this trend (see Table 4). The 
FSSS data (and the sociological data) also show that income disparity is particularly significant 
between the upper decile (10%) and the rest of the population, and the same holds for the lower 
decile. The income increase in deciles two to nine is smoother, which demonstrates that there 
are fundamental differences between the higher and the lower income groups and the rest of the 
population. 
7     Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS), Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement (https://www.census.gov/
data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.2015.html#par_textimage_10).
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Table 4: Distribution of cash income in Russia by quintiles (20 per cent intervals), 1980–2017, % 
Year
Distribution of cash income in Russia by quintiles
First quintile 
(lowest income)
Second 
quintile
Third 
quintile
Fourth 
quintile
Fifth quintile (highest 
income)
1980 10.1 14.8 18.6 23.1 33.4
1990 9.8 14.9 18.8 23.8 32.7
1995 6.1 10.8 15.2 21.6 46.3
1999 6.0 10.5 14.8 21.1 47.6
2003 5.5 10.3 15.3 22.7 46.2
2007 5.1 9.8 14.8 22.5 47.8
2011 5.2 9.9 14.9 22.6 47.4
2015 5.3 10.0 15.0 22.6 47.1
2017 5.4 10.1 15.1 22.6 46.8
Source: FSSS. Distribution of the total cash income and the specifics of cash personal income 
differentiation (http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/bednost/tabl/1-2-2.doc). Data for 
2017 is preliminary,
However, this approach does not uncover the structural changes in income stratification and the 
size of the particular income groups; it only gauges the change in incomes and income distribution 
and says little about the dynamics of the income stratification model itself. 
The second group of approaches, as shown above, sets income groups by measuring their incomes 
against the median values across the population. This method does not predetermine the sizes of 
low/middle/high income groups – they differ depending on the patterns of income distribution. 
This makes an assessment of the changes in the size of income groups possible, given the entire 
population. As this model measures the per capita household income against the median income, 
the structure and sizes of groups do not change if incomes grow or decrease evenly across all groups; 
changes to the model can occur only when patterns of income distribution change. 
The FSSS provides some data based on this approach, but it mainly shows the share of low-income 
groups – those with less than 0.4 – 0.6x the median income. The sociological data can be used 
when defining other income groups under this approach. The key issue here, as with the absolute 
approach, is to set the appropriate income boundaries. Typically, the poverty level is set at 0.5 – 0.6x 
the median income; the middle-class threshold, as shown in the first section of the paper, is often 
set at 0.75 – 1.25x the median, and the upper middle-class boundary is 1.5 – 3x the median. These 
approaches are combined in different ways in various studies and publications. 
Based on the literature review and statistical procedures, we suggest defining a total of five income 
groups. The poverty threshold is set at 0.5x the median income. The vulnerable population consists 
of those with income lower than 0.75x the median (the typical lower demarcation for the middle 
class). The median income group demonstrates a typical standard of living for the whole population 
(0.75 – 1.25x). The middle class (1.25 – 2x the median income) can be considered to be relatively well-
off. Those with income higher than 2x the median income fall into the high-income stratum. 
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To account for household size and economies-of-scale, we chose to apply a well-cited OECD-modified 
equivalence scale currently used by Eurostat, according to which a weighting of 1 is assigned to the 
first adult, 0.5 to the second and to each subsequent person aged 14 and over, and 0.3 to each child 
aged under 14.8
Income stratification in contemporary Russia: specifics and dynamics
The results of applying the proposed scale presented in Table 5 show that most Russians are 
currently characterised by a close-to-median income (taking account of different equivalence 
scales, this amounts to 20,000 – 21,920 roubles or USD 834 – 914 in PPP9 in the World Bank 
version, per person per month in a median household). In autumn 2015, more than one-third 
of the population belonged to the median income group that represented the typical standard 
of living for the country as a whole, since it comprised that part of the population with income 
around the national median. The proportion of poor and vulnerable people was about 22–24% of 
the population, with the vulnerable having the larger share. The overwhelming majority of the 
poor also belonged in the zone of absolute poverty, according to the official subsistence level 
set regionally in Russia. Among the vulnerable, half of the group had incomes below regional 
subsistence levels, which proves the correctness of identifying them as vulnerable to poverty and 
balancing on its edge. 
Other income groups can be considered as being relatively well-off – about one-quarter belonged 
to the ‘middle class’, and the high-income group comprised 13–16% of the population. However, 
as the median income, even accounting for the equivalence scale, is only 2 times higher than the 
official subsistence level (or less than 1.5 times higher in absolute terms), the standard of living for 
the vast majority of the median income group is quite modest, while the position of the ‘middle 
class’ is more favourable. In general, it is the demarcation between these two income groups that 
allows us to divide the Russian population into two major subgroups – the not well-off (around 
60%) and the well-off (40%).
The relative scale that we propose is based on the country’s median income. However, in Russia, 
it is necessary to account for the various living standards across regions10 as well as in the urban 
and rural areas – the cost of living can vary widely, and the same levels of income can indicate 
fundamentally different living standards. Moreover, the official poverty line (subsistence minimum) 
is set independently in each region. The scale can be adjusted for these inequalities with the use 
of region-specific and settlement-specific median income values. There are countries with greater 
disparities between urban and rural incomes (e.g. India and China), while in Russia differences in 
the socio-economic development of regions are more important (Ovcharova, 2014). 
We assessed the income structure using regional and settlement median income values (though it 
should be noted that RLMS–HSE data are not representative by regions, so that assessment can be 
viewed as a rough estimate only, demonstrating potential for further use). The results show that 
the proposed scale yields similar configurations of the income structure (‘middle class society’) 
for all three types of median (Table 5). However, with the use of regional or settlement values, 
the share of the median and middle-income groups increases, while the share of groups with the 
lowest and highest income declines.
 
8     For international comparisons, the square root scale is also widely used. But in practice the difference in results of using 
different scales is not significant (Castellani & Parent, 2010).
9     Using PPP calculated by WB at USD/RUB PPP rate at 23.97 in 2015.
10    By regions, following the administrative definition, we mean federal subjects of Russia, of which there were 85 as of 2018.
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Table 5: Income stratification based on the median values for the country and adjusted for regions 
and types of settlement, 2015, %
Income groups
Household per capita income 
about income median (with 
OECD-modified equivalence 
scale)
Income median
by country by settlement by region
Poor Lower or equal to 0.5 median 8.6 7.0 6.4
Vulnerable 0.5–0.75 15.5 15.9 15.3
Median group 0.75–1.25 37.3 39.4 42.4
Middle class 1.25–2 25.7 26.4 27.2
High income Over 2x median 12.9 11.3 8.6
Source: RLMS–HSE, calculation by authors
While a complex analysis of the living standards of different income groups is not the aim of this 
paper, it is important to show some characteristics of the defined income groups to demonstrate 
the differences in their material well-being (Table 6).
The table indicates several important trends. First, consumer opportunities are significantly 
expanded from the lower to higher income groups. Differences are especially noticeable 
around opportunities to holiday abroad, making large-scale, expensive purchases, and paying 
for children’s university education if necessary. Second, the standard of living that the median 
group demonstrates and which, by the nature of the thresholds used to determine it, is typical 
of the country's population as a whole, can be characterised as quite modest – the share of those 
satisfied with their material situation makes up only one-fifth of the group; the opportunities for 
qualitative improvements in consumption for its representatives are practically non-existent, and 
the ‘safety margin’ is not high – less than a quarter of the group have any significant savings.
On the other hand, the standard of living in the median group, as well as the standard of living in 
the groups with even lower levels of income (the vulnerable and poor), is already far from the level 
of survival in contemporary Russian society. Even among the poor, the vast majority have their 
own mobile phones, more than 60% have washing machines in their households, more than half 
own computers, and more than a third own cars; one-third of the representatives of this group can 
afford additional educational services for children.
The results also show that the freedom of choice among consumption models is available only to 
a subgroup of the middle class and high-income groups. That is demonstrated by their ownership 
of relatively rare durable goods (smartphones, tablets) and consumer opportunities that are not 
typical for the Russian population in general – the ability to afford major purchases, vacations 
abroad, and so on.
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Table 6: Some characteristics of living standards in income groups, 2015, % 
Aspects of consumption
Income groups
Poor Vulnerable Median group
Middle 
class
High 
income
Satisfaction with material well-being
Completely or rather satisfied 
with material well-being 15.8 17.7 20.8 26.1 30.3
Do not worry about providing 
for themselves with necessities 
in the next 12 months
12.9 17.9 16.6 20.8 31.0
Consumption opportunities
Have the opportunity to improve 
housing conditions if desired 3.0 4.0 4.0 9.2 15.4
Have the opportunity to save 
money for large purchases 3.1 5.0 8.9 23.6 36.8
Have the opportunity to spend 
the whole family vacation 
abroad
1.7 3.1 6.4 20.1 37.6
Have the opportunity to pay 
for their children’s university 
education if necessary
11.7 26.0 29.3 40.9 61.0
Have the opportunity to pay for 
additional educational services 
for children if necessary
30.6 49.4 56.0 70.5 85.7
Property and durable goods ownership
Have a TV in the household 98.0 99.7 98.9 98.5 99.4
Have a washing machine in the 
household 62.0 73.6 87.5 93.7 96.4
Have a dishwasher in the 
household 0.2 0.3 2.8 5.9 13.1
Have a computer / laptop in the 
household 55.2 66.9 74.5 87.7 95.0
Have a personal cell phone 79.9 81.3 79.8 74.0 64.9
Have a personal smartphone 7.3 11.0 18.0 32.1 47.9
Have a personal tablet 12.3 17.4 22.1 34.0 48.1
Have a car in the household 34.8 42.8 46.6 61.6 74.5
Savings
Have household savings they 
can live on for 6 months or more 1.4 0.9 2.3 3.2 7.6
Have household savings they 
can live on for a few months, 
but less than six months
7.6 17.1 22.1 26.4 34.7
Source: RLMS-HSE, calculation by authors
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Finally, let us turn to the question of what changes the income stratification of Russian society 
has undergone in the last two decades. The starting point is 1994, when the consequences of 
the liberal reforms launched in 1992 became fully manifest, and the situation in the country 
was characterised by an economic crisis. In 2015, the country was once again in the midst of an 
economic crisis, but one with different causes and consequences. Russian society entered a new 
stage of economic recession (in 2014) with qualitatively different characteristics of population 
income and living standards. Figure 1 presents the dynamics of the income stratification, based on 
the country income median and OECD-modified equivalence scale for 1994–2015.
Figure 1: Income stratification according to the relative approach using the country's median 
income dynamics for 2014–2016, %
Source: RLMS-HSE, calculation by authors
As can be seen from Figure 1, the period from 1994 to 2015 was characterised by a gradual decline 
in relative income differentiation among the general population in Russia (without accounting 
for the upper and lower 3–4%, who were not included in the sample of mass surveys). Groups 
at opposite ends of the spectrum – those with incomes below 0.5x the median and more than 2x 
the median – significantly decreased as a share of the population during this period: in 1994, the 
share of the first group was 19.0% but by 2015 it had fallen to 8.6%; for the second group, these 
figures were 20.0% and 12.9% respectively. The decrease in the shares of these income groups 
was accompanied by the expansion of the median group, which in two decades has grown from 
a quarter of the population (26.0%) to more than a third (37.3%), and currently dominates the 
income structure. These trends concerning income stratification and changes in the proportion 
of income groups defined on the basis of the median income as an average standard are not fully 
reflected in the official statistics, which operate mainly with absolute indicators of income. As 
can be seen from the dynamics of the Gini coefficient, from 1994 to 2007, overall inequality in the 
country increased (0.409 to 0.422), and only then did it begin to decline slightly (to 0.412 in 2015), 
still remaining quite high from an international perspective.11
However, the inequality indicators are calculated considering the high differentiation of income 
levels within the extremely poor and wealthy groups (incomes of which are estimated indirectly 
and re-evaluated). That allows us to obtain a general picture of the country, but distorts the 
situation among the mass population between the poorest and wealthiest (accounting for the 
11     Data source: FSSS (URL: https://fedstat.ru/indicator/31165, extracted on 17.03.2018)
41Income Stratification in Russia: What do Different Approaches Demonstrate?
average standard of living and economies-of-scale). According to RLMS–HSE data, the last two 
decades were characterised by a tendency towards the equalisation of incomes and an increasing 
proportion of the population with incomes close to the median value; in other words, a growing 
number of people are living in roughly the same conditions and have a similar living standard that 
reflects the general living standard of the country, while being quite different from the typical 
conditions of the groups that are at the top and bottom of the income scale. 
Conclusion
Constructing a scale of income stratification which can be used in empirical sociological research 
is not a trivial task. Different approaches can show different levels of effectiveness when applied to 
specific socio-economic conditions in a certain country. The choice between them should take into 
account their heuristic potential tested on empirical data reflecting the current conditions of the 
society of interest. There are various approaches to income stratification that can be divided into 
two broad categories – relative and absolute. Empirical analysis shows that the most widely used 
thresholds of the absolute approach cannot be efficiently applied to contemporary Russian society, 
which has undergone fundamental changes over the last 15 years regarding income, as they fail 
to define subgroups within the population. At the beginning of the 2000s, the situation in Russia 
was quite different and such approaches were relevant. Now absolute models of stratification 
rank Russia in line with developed rather than developing countries (in particular, the issue of 
extreme poverty – on the limits of physical survival – is gone), rendering absolute income bounds, 
set for the latter group of countries, irrelevant. This might be the case for some other societies in 
transition as well, which presents a challenging task when constructing a relative scale of income 
stratification that makes capturing the specifics of income groups in society and the dynamics in 
their composition possible. The task is somewhat complicated by the fact that many studies focus 
on defining one group / stratum in society (poor, middle class, wealthy) but not constructing a 
scale that classifies the entire population. In this paper, we propose a scale constructed according 
to the relative approach and based on median income as the social standard of living. 
The application of the relative approach in this version shows that the income of most Russians is 
close to the median income of the country as a whole. Middle-income groups dominate; however, 
the lower group (median income group) outnumbers the middle class. The income of the median 
group is not high in absolute terms; its living standards are quite modest and are typical of Russian 
society in general. As of autumn 2015, about one-quarter of the Russian population was poor or at 
risk of poverty, but even their standards of living were far from the standards of survival.
The dynamics of income stratification in the period 1994–2015 demonstrate a gradual decline in 
income differentiation among the general population. Both poor and high-income groups have 
declined in share over the past twenty years, while the share of median groups has increased quite 
significantly – from a quarter to more than a third of the population. These trends complement 
the picture of the dynamics of income and income inequality, which can be obtained from official 
statistics.
These trends in the transformation of the income stratification can have both positive and negative 
consequences and call for a separate discussion. On the one hand, the reduction of income 
inequality in the mass strata reduces the problem of social tension in the low-income and lower 
middle-income groups of the population, since income inequality, which according to official 
statistics remains quite high, is one of the most acute social problems for contemporary Russian 
society. On the other hand, the general tendency towards an overall "levelling" that includes the 
shrinking of the upper groups can lead to a request for a revision of the social contract with the 
state from the most educated, qualified and well-off groups since it means a decrease in social 
mobility for them.
Future research might include testing the heuristic potential of the income stratification scale in 
international comparisons between countries belonging to different income groups and stages 
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of socio-economic and socio-cultural development; it would be especially interesting to compare 
models and changes in their configuration over time in societies in transition. Another interesting 
point of future research would be the analysis of relations between labour market transformations 
and income stratification, since they are closely interconnected. For many European countries, 
recent financial and economic crises have brought an erosion of the middle class via changes in the 
structure of jobs and occupations (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2016); analysis of these transformations in 
Russia and their connection with income stratification in Russia may provide similar or different 
results and contribute to our understanding of the specifics of societies in transition. 
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